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Executive Summary
This paper examines the recent droughts in Malawi 
and Zambia [covering the period 1990-2005 but 
with a focus on the 2001/2002 Southern African 
crisis], analyzing the impact of the droughts on 
food security and the responses to the crises. 
Several questions make these two countries par­
ticularly complex case studies: Why did relatively 
mild weather shocks lead to such a devastating 
crisis in 2001/2002? How did lack of coordination 
between governments and donors exacerbate the 
crisis? And why, given the historical tendency of 
these countries to experience recurrent droughts, 
were no measures put into place to counter the 
adverse impacts of the drought?
The two countries share a number of characteris­
tics that make them particularly vulnerable to food 
crises: unfavorable weather patterns, a high
dependence on maize as the staple crop, poor 
health standards, unfavorable socioeconomic condi­
tions, and a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. The 
groups that have been most adversely affected in 
the population include landless people, female­
headed households, and the growing number of 
orphans. Both governments, under pressure from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), began 
liberalizing their agricultural sectors in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, which increased food 
insecurity in the countries. One response to 
drought has been increased food aid, with organiza­
tions like the World Bank, the World Food Pro­
gramme (WFP), the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF), the UK Department for Inter­
national Development (DFID), Oxfam, and others 
creating and supporting food aid and safety net 
programs. Food aid, in general, has been the sub­
ject of much criticism even though international 
organizations maintain that food aid is necessary in 
response to the recurrent crises in Southern Africa.
Policy options include (1) increasing food reserves, 
(2) encouraging formal and informal trade, (3) 
creating social protection programs, (5) establishing 
innovative programs such as the Targeted Inputs 
Programme and futures contracts, and (6) setting 
up a global contingency fund.
As an official of an international development assis­
tance agency, your assignment is to design a 
strategy that will assist Malawi and Zambia in 
coping with the combined risks of food insecurity, 
drought, and HIV/AIDS.
Background
This paper examines the recent droughts in Malawi 
and Zambia [covering the period 1990-2005 but 
with a focus on the 2001/2002 Southern African 
crisis), analyzing the impact of the droughts on 
food security and the responses to the crises. In 
the 1990s Southern Africa experienced droughts in 
1991/1992, followed only two years later by drought 
in Malawi and Zambia in 1993/1994 and then by 
drought in countries farther south in 1994/1995. A 
similar pattern repeated itself after the turn of the 
century, with the entire region experiencing 
droughts in 2000/2001 and 2001/2002, with 
particularly adverse impacts on Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Between February and April 2002, the 
governments of Lesotho, Malawi, and Zimbabwe 
declared emergencies, and in July 2002 the United 
Nations sent out an appeal for US$611 million to 
address the crisis in the six worst-affected coun­
tries: Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Cromwell and Kyegombe 
2005).
What makes Malawi and Zambia particularly com­
plex case studies are questions about why relatively 
mild weather shocks led to such a devastating crisis 
in 2001/2002 (Dorward and Kydd 2004), how lack 
of government-donor coordination exacerbated the 
crisis (Devereux 2002b), and why, given the 
historical tendency of these countries to experience 
recurrent droughts, these disasters were not fore­
seen and measures not put into place to counter 
the adverse impacts of the drought (IEG 2006). In 
his paper on the 2002 Malawi crisis, Devereux 
(2002b) said that the disaster stemmed from both 
technical reasons, such as production failure, 
information constraints, a depleted food reserve, 
import bottlenecks, and unaffordably high food 
prices, and political reasons caused by negative
synergies between government and donor policies 
and practices.
This paper examines the circumstances of the 
droughts in Malawi and Zambia: the policy issues, 
stakeholders, and responses to the crisis. In par­
ticular, it looks at the policies that exacerbated the 
crisis, considers the policy responses to the crisis, 
and provides various policy options.
Food Security in Malawi and Drought
Situating Malawi in Southern A frica . Malawi is one 
of the poorest countries in Africa, with a per capita 
gross domestic product [GDP] of US$170 in 2000, 
which fell to US$160 in 2002. It has some of the 
world's lowest health and social indicators as well as 
high HIV prevalence rates [World Bank 2006a], 
There is a high dependence on foreign aid, even 
though aid flows declined considerably in 2 0 0 0 - 
2004 because the government had not complied 
with its agreements with donors [World Bank 
2006a; WFP 2007], This lack of donor coordi­
nation with the Malawi government led to a very 
slow donor response to the 2001/2002 crisis. A 
change in government in 2004, coupled with 
Malawi's receipt of debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries [HIPC] initiative in 
September 2006, will probably lead to aid flows as 
high as those in the late 1990s.
Vulnerability to droughts in Malawi. Malawi is 
extremely dependent on one main staple food 
crop—maize—which accounts for about three- 
quarters of calorie consumption for Malawi's popu­
lation. Even though maize is agroecologically well 
suited to Malawi, smallholder maize production has 
stagnated in the past decade [Dorward and Kydd 
2004], In terms of cash crops, export earnings are 
dominated by tobacco [61 percent] and tea [9 
percent], which are rainfed crops, making Malawi 
vulnerable to variations in rainfall in addition to 
commodity price shocks [Clay et al. 2003], Tea 
earnings are also highly dependent on international 
prices.
Malawi suffers from "thin markets"—that is, very 
low traded volumes of key commodities, manufac­
tures, and services [Dorward and Kydd 2004], This 
situation is due to transportation bottlenecks, high 
communication costs, and therefore high risk 
premiums associated with trading. Thus, for 
Malawi, formal trade with its neighbors was not a
viable solution to the food crisis, especially because 
droughts affected a number of Southern African 
countries at the same time, causing food prices to 
skyrocket.
Livelihoods in Malawi are especially vulnerable 
owing to a combination of factors such as recur­
rent droughts and floods, increasing population 
pressure, declining soil fertility, and the country's 
landlocked geography. The HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
which has a prevalence rate of approximately 20 
percent, is an additional shock to already vulnerable 
households (UNAIDS 2005], The low levels of 
financial and physical capital, coupled with the high 
dependence on agriculture, leave poor people's 
livelihoods vulnerable to risks of natural shocks 
such as adverse weather, crop failure, or physical 
insecurity. According to the World Bank [2003], 
unsustainable agricultural practices, structural 
changes in agriculture and economic processes, and 
institutional weaknesses in agriculture have contri­
buted to the increasing economic instability and 
vulnerability in Malawi. This vulnerability is com­
pounded by the thin markets (Dorward and Kydd 
2004],
Other factors contributing to economic vulnera­
bility include poor governance, inconsistent poli­
cies, short-term variability in external aid levels, and 
the effects of HIV/AIDS on resources [Benson and 
Clay 2004], These factors deepened the crises in 
2001/2002 and 2002/2003, spreading vulnera­
bility even to areas that were not severely affected 
by the drought and accelerating household 
impoverishment. Southern Africa is the area of the 
world most affected by HIV/AIDS, with Botswana, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe recording extremely high 
AIDS mortality rates [De Waal and Whiteside
2003],
Whom do droughts a ffect and how? Smith [2001], 
which formed the framework for the World Bank's 
intervention in Malawi in 2002, argues that the 
droughts severely affected three vulnerable groups 
in particular: landless people, female-headed house­
holds, and the growing number of orphans.
Food Security and Drought in Zambia
Situating Zambia in Southern A frica . Zambia is also 
one of the poorest countries in the world. Defined 
as a least-developed country [LDC] by the World 
Bank, Zambia was ranked 143rd out of 161 countries
in the 2001 Human Developm ent Report. The HIV 
prevalence rate was 14.1 percent in 2005 [UNAIDS 
2005) contributing to high death rates and a 
steadily increasing demographic group of orphans 
[Samatebele 2003).
The country is characterized by a high incidence of 
poverty and exposure to several types of shocks 
like HIV/AIDS, macroeconomic instability, and 
periodic droughts, which have led to severe chronic 
and transitory food insecurity in the country [Del 
Ninno et al. 2005). Around 20 percent of house­
holds are classified as vulnerable (likely to be poor 
and exposed to shocks), whereas 40 percent are 
classified as chronically poor households (poor with 
low levels of human capital). Ten percent are both 
vulnerable and chronically poor (Del Ninno and 
Marini 2005).
Zambia is also dependent on maize as a main staple 
food crop. The production of maize is highly 
dependent on rainfall and thus susceptible to 
droughts. Only 5 percent of total agricultural land 
is irrigated, and 85 percent of cultivated land is 
grown with maize (Del Ninno et al. 2005). 
According to a paper presented at the Southern 
African Regional Poverty Network (Samatebele 
2003), the following factors have compounded 
food insecurity in the country:
• an erratic supply of fertilizer and seed in 
the market;
• insufficient, erratic, and poorly distributed 
rainfall;
• losses of cattle and draught power due to 
animal diseases like corridor;
• high interest rates caused by structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs),
• lack of credit facilities for small-scale 
farmers;
• failure by the government to release funds 
to the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) to 
enable it to smooth out shortages and 
store food from one season to the next;
• high prevalence of HIV/AIDS;
• poor extension services; and
• unsustainable farming practices that have 
degraded the land.
H isto ry o f droughts in the country. Along with 
the rest of Southern Africa, Zambia suffered a
severe drought in 1991 and 1992. It was also hit by 
more localized droughts in its southern and west­
ern regions in 1994 and 1995, as well as in 1998, 
2001/2002, and 2002/2003 (Del Ninno et al. 
2005). According to the WFP (2007), 2.3 million 
people needed emergency food aid in Zambia 
owing to erratic rains and prolonged dry spells in 
2005/2006. Like Malawi, Zambia's vulnerability to 
food crises can be attributed to a complex combi­
nation of factors such as unfavorable weather pat­
terns, poor health standards, and poor socio­
economic conditions. The 2003 crisis was further 
compounded by reduced food production in two 
preceding seasons (2000/2001 and 2001/2002), 
which resulted in substantial deficits of staple food 
(Samatebele 2003).
Whom do droughts a ffect and how? The impacts 
of droughts are felt most directly by farmers, 
because of loss of crop production and cattle, and 
by consumers, because of the higher consumer 
prices of food commodities in general and of maize 
in particular [Del Ninno and Marini 2005). The 
indirect impacts affect certain vulnerable groups 
such as widows and separated female-headed 
households, as well as households whose income 
comes mainly from agriculture and that have a 
large proportion of area under crop cultivation. 
Droughts have a large impact on the distribution of 
consumption of both the poor and nonpoor 
households in rural areas [Smith 2001).
Productivity in both Malawi and Zambia was low 
because poor farmers had difficulty getting access 
to inputs and could not get their goods to markets 
owing to poor infrastructure. In addition, lack of 
market integration prevented the transfer of food 
from food-surplus to food-deficit areas at afforda­
ble prices. Food availability declined substantially 
during drought years. Furthermore, the lack of 
transparency concerning government policy on 
commercial imports and sales added to traders' 
uncertainties and kept private sector imports from 
stabilizing market prices following major produc­




There are conflicting views on the role of the 
government in agricultural markets. The World
Bank and the IMF argue that national and house­
hold food security in Malawi and Zambia is best 
achieved by liberalizing agricultural production and 
marketing and that the liberalizing reforms have 
improved market efficiency, reduced budget 
deficits, stimulated export production, and 
increased the share of the final price received by 
farmers. On the other hand, critics of liberalization 
argue it has exacerbated household food insecurity 
by destabilizing agricultural prices, widening the 
income distribution gap, and reducing access to 
low-cost inputs; they call for more government 
intervention to help poor households manage risk 
[Kherallah et al. 2002], One of the direct impacts 
of the liberalization reforms was a reduction in 
fertilizer subsidies and state enterprises that 
monopolize fertilizer distribution. Fertilizer markets 
are, however, still subject to target distribution 
programs, indirect subsidies, and other forms of 
intervention [Kherallah et al. 2002],
M j Ijw L From the early 1960s to the early 1990s, 
Malawi set up a system of monopolistic marketing 
parastatals and promoted government policies to 
fix exchange rates and control agricultural markets 
in order to stabilize prices and reduce risks for 
farmers. ADMARC, the agricultural marketing 
parastatal, was fairly effective and played an integral 
role in containing the 1991/1992 drought by making 
food from its depots available to people at afford­
able prices (Devereux 2002b). ADMARC's long-run 
sustainability was undermined by its maize subsidi­
zation policies, which were difficult to finance. By 
the late 1980s the parastatal was deemed unsustain­
able because of its growing fiscal demands on the 
government, and under pressure from the IMF, the 
government started liberalizing the agricultural 
sector. The vulnerable "transition" period between 
ADMARC-controlled agricultural marketing and 
full liberalization contributed to the lack of liveli­
hood security for many Malawians during the 
2001/2002 crisis. According to a number of 
critics, the economic austerity measures called for 
by structural adjustment, including removal of 
input and consumer subsidies that the Malawi 
government had introduced in the mid-1990s, 
compounded food insecurity in the country 
[Devereux 2002b).
A controversial issue that led to a souring of 
relations between the government and donors 
during the 2001/2002 crisis was the selling of the 
strategic grain reserves. In 2001 the IMF had
suggested that the government sell some of its 
grain reserves to pay back debt it owed the IMF. 
Instead, the entire stock of grain reserves was sold, 
and by the time the food crisis struck, there was 
no grain to release to the people. What happened 
to the grain is still a mystery. Unconfirmed allega­
tions claim that politically connected people bought 
the grain and then released it at high prices during 
the crisis, thus gaining financially from food 
insecurity in the country. Questions about why the 
stock was sold and to whom aggravated donors, 
leading the IMF to withhold balance of payments 
support; DFID, the European Union [EU), and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development 
[USAID) suspended development assistance, and 
Denmark withdrew completely from Malawi 
[Devereux 2002b).
The 2001/2002 disaster, however, improved the 
government's responses to the disasters that 
followed. With the support of international donors, 
the government implemented the Targeted Inputs 
Programme whereby smallholder farmers are pro­
vided with a tiny pack of free inputs [fertilizer, 
maize seed, and legume seed). The program was 
expanded to near-universal coverage in early 2002 
following the serious food crisis. Originally called 
the Starter Pack Programme, it had had universal 
coverage in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 but was 
then scaled down and targeted to the poorest 
smallholders. The Malawi Starter Pack, later called 
the Targeted Inputs Programme, failed to kick-start 
agricultural growth, yet it succeeded in overcoming 
the severe input constraints facing smallholder 
farmers. At a sufficient geographical scale, it can 
help combat chronic food insecurity by enabling 
poor farmers to grow their own food, thus keeping 
food prices low during the hungry season. It also 
contributes to social protection and is a less expen­
sive option than fertilizer price subsidies, subsidized 
commercial food imports, or food aid [Levy et al.
2004).
Targeted fertilizer subsidies are another program 
the government introduced to deal with food 
insecurity. The current program provides a major­
ity of households with vouchers enabling recipients 
to buy fertilizer at one-third the market cost. Initial 
findings show that these programs are costly, diffi­
cult to sustain, ineffective at targeting poor 
farmers, subject to rent seeking, and harmful to the 
development of sustainable input delivery systems. 
Subsidies are only useful when they produce
significant productivity gains, when they are less 
costly than alternatives such as food aid, and when 
they are designed in a way that avoids negative 
impacts on private markets (Crawford et al. 2005],
To tackle the 2005/2006 crisis, the Government 
of Malawi committed its budgetary resources to an 
emergency assistance program and purchased seed 
and fertilizer for targeted distribution to small­
holder maize farmers at subsidized rates. It also 
launched a "Feed the Nation Fund" program for 
quick access to resources during an emergency 
(CAP 2005], The UN lauded its efforts and sent 
out an appeal in 2005 for US$87.8 million to sup­
port the government's two-pronged approach to 
the food crisis.
Zambia. Overall, food production in Zambia has 
declined substantially since 1990. This decline is 
mainly due to the withdrawal of government subsi­
dies on inputs and an end to pricing policies that 
had favored maize production at the expense of 
other agricultural commodities. The government 
had implemented these policies in the mid-1960s 
and phased them out in mid-1990s under pressure 
from the IMF and in its move toward economic 
liberalization (Del Ninno et al. 2005).
In spite of liberalization, the government continued 
to intervene in food markets by establishing the 
Food Reserve Agency (FRA) in 1995. The FRA was 
meant to purchase and manage maize for the 
national food reserve and to collect and disseminate 
marketing and trade information. The Crop 
Marketing Authority (CMA) replaced the FRA in 
2003 with a mandate to promote markets and to 
maintain enough strategic reserve stocks to ensure 
market supplies for three months. Nijhoff et al. 
(2003) argue, however, that government stocks 
may be redundant and may even destabilize markets 
by discouraging private stockholding and imports.
The Zambian government has attempted to increase 
food supplies through a combination of govern­
ment commercial imports, food aid, food and cash 
transfer programs, and private sector imports (and 
ban on exports] (Del Ninno et al. 2005). Yet 
according to World Bank (2003), the government 
has taken limited action to anticipate shocks and 
design the proper response (Del Ninno and Marini
2005).
Programs and Policies of Nongovernmental 
and Intergovernmental Bodies
Malawi. In 1998, under the leadership of the World 
Bank, a joint government-donor group on safety 
nets was convened (Smith 2001). It was coordinated 
by the government's National Economic Council 
(NEC) and had financial backing from several 
donors including DFID, the EU, WFP, and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
The National Safety Net Programme, as it was 
termed, dealt with a number of issues, including the 
identification and selection of target groups, selec­
tion of appropriate instruments and benefit levels, 
fiscal affordability and sustainability, and a suitable 
"exit strategy" to avoid creating dependency 
(Devereux 2002a).
Smith (2001) said that Malawi typifies the problem 
of providing a safety net in very low-income coun­
tries because (1) a large proportion of the popula­
tion is absolutely poor, with incomes around the 
subsistence minimum, and is prone to severe 
shocks such as droughts and AIDS; (2) growth is 
not rapid enough; (3) with such a large proportion 
of the population in poverty and little surplus to 
redistribute, it is unclear what role safety net trans­
fers should play; (4) the database is weak, making it 
difficult to identify and target the poorest; (5) 
there is limited administrative capacity, making it 
difficult to manage complex programs; and (6) 
although there is no formal safety net program, a 
lot is already spent on transfers under various ad 
hoc donor initiatives but with very little impact on 
poverty.
Devereux (2002a, 2) criticized the National Safety 
Net Programme as "a product of a technocratized 
yet ideologically driven team of expatriate 'experts,' 
working in a vacuum with nominal consultation and 
only token attempts at building a consensus among 
government agencies and other national stake­
holders." There is no doubt that the program had 
its failings, as shown by the critical food shortages 
and hunger-related deaths in rural areas following 
floods in the south and a drought in central 
districts in early 2002. This result underlines the 
importance of instituting safety net programs that 
factor in possible future disasters instead of merely 
dealing with the consequences of the current crisis.
In 2006 a number of agencies were still in Malawi, 
working on the food insecurity rampant in the 
country. For example, Oxfam (2006) said it was
working with WFP in southern Malawi, providing 
food aid to 350,000 people. Oxfam had also 
launched a pilot scheme of emergency cash trans­
fers, as an alternative to food aid, for 22,000 
people in Thyolo district. In 2005 the World Bank 
contributed US$30 million to the Malawi govern­
ment to import food. The WFP sought to increase 
food security among the rural and urban poor in 
Malawi through the creation and rehabilitation of 
community and household assets in food insecure 
areas [WFP 2007], primarily through its Food for 
Assets and Development Program. In this program 
the WFP distributes family food rations to partici­
pants [mainly smallholder farmers] who participate 
in its asset-building programs, which include build­
ing or rehabilitating irrigation schemes, roads, 
drainage systems, and other infrastructure. Other 
agencies that are combating food insecurity gener­
ated by the Malawi food crisis of 2005/2006 
include Action against Hunger, Concern World­
wide, UNICEF, and Action Aid (CAP 2005],
Zambia. The Zambian government declared a disas­
ter in May 2001. In response, UNICEF, the UNDP, 
the WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations [FAO], and the World 
Health Organization [WHO] produced the UN 
Emergency Consolidated Appeal [CAP], requesting 
funding of US$71.39 million for emergency food 
assistance. The assistance targeted 1.7 million bene­
ficiaries and had a distribution target of 224,000 
metric tons [MT] of relief food. Beginning in 
August 2002 the Zambian government, in collabo­
ration with the WFP and other UN systems, began 
the Emergency Operation Programme [EMOP], 
which included the distribution of food and non­
food items to 43 affected districts (Samatebele 
2003],
Because of limited information on the demography 
and problems of vulnerable households, however, it 
was difficult to reach the people who were most in 
need. Furthermore, the government refused the 
genetically modified maize brought into the coun­
try by the WFP, increasing the need to prioritize 
the groups that were the most vulnerable. Only 11 
percent of the planned relief requirements were 
received by December 2002 (Samatebele 2003]. In 
2006, according to information released by the 
national Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 
Zambia's agricultural season was generally good 
even though in some regions excessive rains limited 
crop production [WFP 2006],
The Role of Food A id
Food aid in general has been the subject of much 
criticism. Some of the critiques include lack of 
timelines and high cost of delivery to the recipient 
country (Barrett and Maxwell 2005 as quoted in 
Gentilini 2007], high administrative costs within 
countries, and leakages in the distribution of food 
aid (Smith and Subbarao 2003 as quoted in 
Gentilini 2007], It has also been blamed for causing 
disincentives for domestic production because it 
reduces domestic prices and can lead to reduced 
public and private investment in food production. 
Thus, the benefits of food aid in addressing acute 
short-term food insecurity may be offset by the 
cost of reducing long-term food security (Del 
Ninno et al. 2005], One criticism of the response 
to the 2002/2003 crises was an overemphasis on 
food aid, which Witteveen [2006] said is a “blunt 
tool" inadequate to respond to complex crises such 
as the 2001/2002 Southern African crisis.
There is also an ongoing debate on food versus 
cash transfers, primarily concerning whether cash 
and food transfers are alternative or comple­
mentary, and in which circumstances they should 
be adopted (Gentilini 2007], In a 2006 regional 
workshop on cash transfers in Southern Africa, 
Stephen Devereux argued that food entitlements 
can leave people vulnerable to failures in four main 
areas: production, labor markets, commodity 
markets, and informal transfers (RHVP 2007b], 
These vulnerabilities have led to a recent push from 
donors toward cash transfers, often in lieu of food 
transfers. The rapidly rising popularity of cash 
transfers in both emergency and development con­
texts has raised a number of political, financial, and 
operational challenges for governments, donors, 
and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] 
(Farrington and Slater 2006],
In 2005/2006 Oxfam designed cash transfer pilot 
programs that provided 13,500 and 6,000 house­
holds in Zambia and Malawi respectively with a 
monthly disbursement of cash. One of the objec­
tives of the pilot programs was to explore alterna­
tives to food aid. An independent evaluation 
carried out by the Overseas Development Institute 
[ODI] in April 2006 found that unconditional cash 
transfers can be an appropriate response to acute 
food insecurity in certain contexts, but rigorous 
monitoring and flexibility in the planning and 
availability of resources are crucial. Additionally, 
agencies cannot assume that cash transfers will be
more cost-effective, particularly in remote areas 
with weak markets (Witteveen 2006).
Malawi. Because of the souring of donor-govern­
ment relations, especially over the issue of the sale 
of the strategic grain reserve, donors were slow to 
respond to the 2001/2002 crisis, and the food aid, 
though unconditional, arrived very late. The conse­
quences of this delay were severe, including mal­
nutrition and death for tens of thousands of 
Malawians.
The Government of Malawi had requested donor 
assistance in August 2001, citing a possible food 
crisis, but donors did not respond. In November
2001 several major donors—including Denmark, 
the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States—suspended their aid programs in Malawi in 
protest against alleged corruption and economic 
mismanagement by the Malawi government.
There have been two main explanations for this 
delayed reaction from the donors. The first is that 
the donors did not have adequate information on 
the scale of the disaster and did not believe that a 
famine was actually underway. The second explana­
tion points to the poor relations between the 
Malawi government and the donors that made 
them hesitant to extend support during the 
drought crisis [Devereux 2002b).
Even after donors started sending food aid to 
Malawi, the relationship between the government 
and the donors remained strained. In mid-May
2002 the IMF suspended disbursement of US$47 
million in loans to Malawi owing to overspending 
by the government and blamed the government for 
having created famine conditions that led to the 
2001/2002 crisis (Devereux 2002a).
Nonetheless, the crisis of 2001/2002 mobilized 
donors and the government to better prepare for 
future droughts. The Malawi government launched 
appeals for food aid in January and February 2002, 
and a number of countries and international agen­
cies responded. Also in February 2002, the 
government set up a Task Force on the Food Crisis 
through which donors, NGOs, and the govern­
ment could work together to combat food 
insecurity.
Zambia. Zambia's urban maize flour subsidies in the 
1980s were untargeted and involved unsustainably
large fiscal subsidies, and in the early 1990s the 
government eliminated them. This policy change 
has led to a substantial decline in food production 
since 1990, owing largely to the withdrawal of sub­
sidies on inputs and an end to pricing policies that 
had favored maize production at the expense of 
other agricultural commodities. Thus Zambia has 
relied on food aid, supplemented by government 
commercial imports, to address major drought- 
related maize production declines.
Food aid programs were the main safety net in 
Zambia and in Southern Africa after the mid-1990s. 
Food aid included food transfers, food for assets, 
school feeding programs, supplementary feeding, 
and support to HIV/AIDS-affected households. 
Food-for-cash and cash-for-work programs were 
also implemented after the 1995 crisis. Food aid, 
both to provide short-term emergency relief and 
to help address medium-term food deficits, is thus 
often a major component of food security strate­
gies in Zambia (Haddad and Frankenberger 2003).
At the end of these food aid programs, however, 
argues Devereux (2000), these areas suffered 
massive economic recession (as quoted in Del 
Ninno et al. 2005). He suggests that Zambia may 
have become dependent on food aid in the 1990s; 
between 1990 and 1995, in response to several 
droughts, certain areas in western Zambia received 
food aid in four out of five years. Devereux (2000) 
further argues that substantial sales of food aid 
show that the quantities distributed were too large, 
arrived too late, and were poorly targeted (Del 
Ninno et al. 2005).
The drought recovery project implemented after 
the 2001 crisis focused on implementing safety net 
interventions, mostly public works and agricultural 
input subsidies, instead of just supplying food aid. 
In 2002 the Zambian government appealed for 
humanitarian aid. The National Vulnerability 
Assessment Committee then initiated a series of 
food security assessments in August and December 
2002 and April 2003 in order to identify needs 
and determine food aid distribution priorities 
within the country. Food aid continued to move 
into the country, and Zambia received a total of 
176,000 MT of food aid from 2000/2001 to 
2002/2003. Still, per capita food availability fell.
The Role of Tradc
There is great scope for using informal cross- 
border trade in the Southern African region to 
meet food needs in Zambia and Malawi because 
agroecological and climatological variations ensure 
that there is usually good production in at least 
some parts of the region [Mano et al. 2003], Both 
Malawi and Zambia are landlocked countries that 
trade extensively with their Southern African 
neighbors, especially the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo [DRC], South Africa, and Zimbabwe. 
Importing food has been seen as a high-cost 
approach to ensuring food availability in Malawi 
given that official maize imports are estimated to 
cost up to five times was much as domestically 
produced maize [Levy 2003 as quoted in Cromwell 
and Kyegombe 2005], Yet, through cross-border 
trade, moving cereals from surplus-producing areas 
like northern Mozambique to deficit areas in 
Malawi and Zambia is a viable option to meet the 
food needs in those countries [Mano et al. 2003], 
In 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 informal trade 
between Malawi and Mozambique was estimated to 
have accounted for between one-third and one-half 
of total maize imports [Cromwell and Kyegombe
2005) . Various regional trade agreements and 
forums have been set up recently to encourage 
cross-border trade, and there is a particular focus 
on the Malawi-Zambia-Mozambique trading triangle.
A new food security instrument being considered 
for the Southern African grain markets is the use 
of futures contracts. The reasoning for this is as 
follows: in 1998 and 2002 the governments of 
Malawi and Zambia imported grains at high prices; 
at the same time, the South African Futures 
Exchange [SAFEX) saw a steady increase in maize 
trading volumes, which suggested the possibility of 
hedging regional import requirements [Dana et al.
2006) . The study by Dana et al. [2006) showed 
that the Malawian and Zambian maize prices gener­
ally move closely together, are very volatile, and 
were exceptionally high during 2001/2002, both 
absolutely and relative to world and regional levels. 
The 2001/2002 crisis resulted in regional shortfalls 
that drove up South African prices relative to the 
world market. Thus, Malawi and Zambia were twice 
affected; first by the increased differential relative 
to South Africa, and second by the increase in the 
South African differential relative to the world 
market [Dana et al. 2006).
In the 2005/2006 agricultural season, final food 
estimates showed that Malawi would face a food 
gap of about 400,000 MT. In response, the 
government signed an options contract with the 
Standard Bank of South Africa in 2005, giving it 
the right to buy additional maize at a price fixed at 
the time that the contract was signed [up to a 
maximum of 60,000 MT at US$18 million), which 
is enough to meet the food gap if commercial and 
donor imports are not high enough. So far, the 
experience has been positive—most of the maize 
purchased was used to meet humanitarian needs 
and had the best delivery performance of all the 
maize imported into Malawi [Slater and Dana 2006). 
In addition, by the time of delivery in December 
2005 and January 2006, prices had risen to 
between US$50 and US$90 above the ceiling price 
of the contract, showing that without the options 
contract, Malawi would have paid much more to 
secure the same amount of maize. Options con­
tracts have the potential to make humanitarian 
agencies more efficient [by improving the value of 
every food aid dollar), more effective [by mitigating 
price risks and thereby reducing the overall levels 
of humanitarian need), and more supportive of 
local trade [by focusing on risk management roles 
instead of trading functions) [Slater and Dana 
2006).
Stakeholders
The groups that form the stakeholders are com­
mon to Malawi and Zambia. They represent vulner­
able households, farmers, the national govern­
ments, and external donors. This section outlines 
the role of each group of stakeholders, how they 
were affected by the famine, and how they affected 
it.
Citizens
The farmers are directly affected by the droughts 
because they suffer from loss of crop production 
and cattle, leading to loss of incomes and purchas­
ing power. Because both Malawi and Zambia rely 
heavily on agriculture, droughts adversely affect 
the whole economy, and the approximately 70 
percent of people directly involved in agriculture 
face livelihood shocks and food and economic 
crises. Consumers are affected through the higher 
consumer prices of food commodities in general 
and of maize in particular.
The consequences of droughts include shocks to 
household livelihoods, with reduced incomes 
leading to increasing levels of poverty and increases 
in staple food prices. This combination of reduced 
incomes and higher food prices made it difficult for 
people to buy food, resulting in deep food 
insecurity. The food crisis was exacerbated by 
political problems such as donor-government 
tensions and government corruption, as well as by 
the AIDS epidemic, which decimated agricultural 
labor. People's coping methods include dietary 
changes such as reducing the amount eaten at 
meals, or skipping meals altogether, which leads to 
increasing levels of malnutrition and deteriorating 
public health [Samatebele 2003].
Civil society groups, especially in Malawi, are 
strongly engaged in the struggle against food inse­
curity. A  number of Malawian civil society organi­
zations are campaigning for "food justice" and "the 
right to food." For example, the Malawi Civil 
Society Agriculture Network "promotes sustainable 
livelihoods for the rural poor by influencing policy, 
practices, attitudes of the government, donors, and 
civil society through advocacy and networking"
[see
http: / / www.cisanet.org/AboutUs/ Aboutus.html. 
Similarly, the Malawi Economic Justice Network is a 
coalition of civil society organizations committed to 
poverty reduction through partnerships that 
ensure that government policies and actions are of 
direct benefit to the poor 
[see http:/ / www.mein.mw/aim.htmn.
National and State Governments
In Malawi, before the joint government-donor 
National Safety Net Programme, the government 
had implemented some smaller programs to address 
severe food insecurity. The National Safety Net 
Programme was the first national-level response to 
the crisis. Devereux [2002a] argues that the 
government's limited fiscal base does not allow it to 
implement either development programs or safety 
nets and that therefore it has very little leverage or 
bargaining power with its "development partners."
In Zambia the government has attempted to 
increase food security through a number of 
measures, including government commercial 
imports, food aid, private sector imports, and food 
and cash transfer programs. After the Zambian 
government declared a food crisis and appealed for
humanitarian aid in 2002, the National Vulnera­
bility Assessment Committee carried out food 
security assessments in 2002 and 2003 to identify 
needs and inform food aid distribution priorities 
within the country.
Donors and International Organizations
Zambia had faced two consecutive disasters: the 
2000 /2001  drought reduced crop yields by almost 
40 percent of the anticipated harvest, and 
2001/2002 also brought a production deficit. The 
Zambian government declared a disaster in May
2001 and, shortly after, the Government of Malawi 
declared a state of national disaster in February
2002 because of widespread famine and the 
mounting toll of hunger-related deaths. Both 
governments appealed to the international donor 
community and to various UN agencies for assis­
tance.
There was a concerted response by the interna­
tional donor and humanitarian community to the 
Southern African crisis in 2001/2002. The United 
Nations, through "Consolidated Inter-Agency 
Appeals in Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in 
Southern Africa," called upon the donor com­
munity for more than US$600 million to  support a 
multisectoral approach in responding to the 
Southern African crisis. The WFP, which took the 
lead on providing food aid, launched two successive 
regional emergency operations [EMOPs], and 
generous donor response enabled it to provide 
emergency food aid to 10 million people between 
July 2002 and June 2 0 0 4  [WFP 2007], Many 
NGOs also responded to the crisis, including 
CARE, Africare, Malawi Red Cross, Catholic Relief 
Services [CRS], Save the Children, World Vision, 
and Concern Universal.
Policy Options
Some of the issues to be addressed with regard to 
the food crises in Malawi and Zambia include 
strategic grain reserves, trade, social protection 
programs, innovative government programs, and 
the role of food aid.
Food Reserves
In both Malawi and Zambia, authorities failed to 
ensure that there were sufficient food reserves to  
mitigate food shortages. Although food reserves
are now acknowledged as central to ensuring food 
security, there is still no agreement about how 
much should be stored. Most opinions tend to 
vary between 60,000 and 180,000 MT, with local 
governments arguing for larger reserves and many 
donors arguing for less [Devereux 2002a].
Informal Cross-Border Trade
Because both Malawi and Zambia are landlocked 
countries, it is difficult for them to gain access to 
food quickly. Price rises, combined with transporta­
tion delays, make these countries extremely vulner­
able to price and supply fluctuations in external 
markets. It costs up to five times more to import 
maize than to produce it. During the 2001/2002 
food crisis, formal trade could not have worked as 
a means to meet food needs because maize prices 
rose owing to a general regional shortage, which 
was compounded by price hikes and communica­
tion and transportation costs. Informal cross- 
border trade, however, is a potential way to 
address maize supply shortages in Malawi and 
Zambia, especially from food-surplus areas like 
northern Mozambique to food-deficit areas like 
southern Malawi and parts of Zambia. For informal 
trade to be successful in combating food inse­
curity, however, both governments must imple­
ment policies and programs that reduce the cost of 
trade [Arlindo and Tschirley 2003], Initiatives such 
as regional trade forums and agreements are steps 
toward ensuring that the advantages of cross- 
border informal trade can be fully realized in future 
drought situations in the region.
Social Protection Programs
The National Safety Net Programme was the first 
attempt by policymakers in Malawi to provide a 
comprehensive package of social protection meas­
ures for poor and vulnerable Malawians. The three 
objectives were [1] increasing lean season consump­
tion of the poorest 20 percent, [2] providing direct 
assistance to those unable to look after themselves, 
and [3] providing increased coverage during 
adverse economic events or shocks such as 
droughts.
One criticism of existing safety nets in these coun­
tries is that they are an unsustainable response to 
structural problems like AIDS or rural landlessness 
because consumption transfers, food aid, and 
seasonal public works do not solve crises of low 
production or address issues of landlessness. Yet
because of their visibility and clear targets, they are 
often kept in place while more sustainable poverty 
reduction measures are delayed.
Malawi and Zambia currently implement cash trans­
fers and food aid programs, which usually target 
the most vulnerable and poorest households 
affected by food insecurity. These controversial 
programs often have conflicting results. Both 
Malawi and Zambia will be interesting case studies 
of the cash versus food debate, with their history 
of food aid interventions in juxtaposition with an 
increasing number of visible and well-funded cash 
transfer programs in recent years. Devereux 
[2002a] argues that a dangerous cycle of food aid 
dependency has developed in Malawi since 
2001/2002. This argument is also partially true of 
Zambia, given that recurrent droughts have forced 
the government to rely on external food aid to 
combat food insecurity. Yet agencies like DFID, 
USAID, and the WFP claim that there are very few 
alternatives to food aid, especially as an immediate 
response to an emergency food crisis.
Other examples of recent targeted programs in 
Malawi include the Targeted Inputs Programme for 
smallholder farmers and targeted fertilizer subsidies. 
The Targeted Inputs Programme has been relatively 
successful, but the fertilizer subsidies have proved 
to be very expensive and not successfully targeted 
to those who need them. Targeted interventions 
work only when the most vulnerable benefit from 
the programs and should be adopted only when 
they are less expensive than other food insecurity 
instruments like food aid and commercial imports.
Innovative Initiatives
Given the nature of the recurrent droughts and 
food crises in Malawi and Zambia, innovative means 
of addressing deep-rooted food insecurity in the 
countries are needed. Two such methods are [1] the 
futures market, such as the options contract 
piloted by the Government of Malawi, which has 
shown initial positive results, and [2] improving 
informal cross-border trade between countries like 
Malawi and Mozambique so that during food 
shortages even landlocked countries like Malawi 
and Zambia will have access to less expensive food.
A Global Contingency Fund
There is a lot of research on the issue of whether 
relief comes at the cost of long-term development.
In a report to the World Bank, the Independent 
Evaluation Group said that it is critical that disas­
ters be calculated as part of development since 
some countries are in a near-permanent state of 
recovery [IEG 2006]. Malawi and Zambia are both 
losing sight of the long-term priorities of mitigat­
ing and managing disaster risk as they concentrate 
on the short-term goal of reacting to an emer­
gency.
The IEG [2006] also mentioned a proposal to 
expand an existing UN program to provide a global 
contingency funding mechanism. Global strategies 
like this mechanism are crucial given that one of 
the problems of emergency drought relief is that a 
delay between the crisis and the mobilization of 
resources and food can lead to deaths and can have 
detrimental side effects on long-term development.
Assignment
As an official of an international development assis­
tance agency, your assignment is to design a strat­
egy that will assist Malawi and Zambia in coping 
with the combined risks of food insecurity, 
drought, and HIV/AIDS.
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